Athleta Christi: George Kastrioti Skanderbeg

Elton Varfi

In Aid of Ferrante d'Aragona

The year 1458 was an annus horribilis for George Kastrioti Skanderbeg. On June 27, his great protector Alfonso of Aragon, King of Naples, a prince endowed with great mental and sentimental qualities, generous, loyal, a lover and supporter of the sciences and letters, died in Naples. He had always held a true admiration for Skanderbeg. All of Albania and Skanderbeg himself harbored a true and profound gratitude towards this prince, so much so that his death aroused sincere regret among them. With the death of the King, the kingdom passed to his illegitimate son Ferrante, a man with more limited political views compared to his father, furthermore threatened by foreign claimants. George Kastrioti suffered another severe loss. Almost simultaneously with the King of Naples, Uranaconte, the most faithful and able among the Albanian captains, passed away.

Guido Mazzoni. Ferrante d'Aragona. National Museum of Naples. Photo Alinari

In Italy, the House of Anjou claimed the succession, invoking rights already recognized by the provisions of the late Queen Joanna II, daughter of Charles III of Durazzo. John of Anjou presented himself to occupy the throne, supported in his claims by almost all the barons of the kingdom and the potentates of Italy, but not by the Duke of Milan and Pope Pius II, who had declared themselves in favor of Ferrante. Consequently, a war broke out between the two claimants, in which Ferrante initially had the worse and, exhausted of means to sustain it in open campaign, was forced to take refuge in Bari, where he was besieged by the Prince of Anjou and Piccinino. Seeing himself lost, he requested the help of Skanderbeg, inviting him to come to Italy to his aid. The feeling of gratitude towards the late Alfonso of Aragon was alive in Albania, and thus Ferrante's invitation was enthusiastically received by those populations who unanimously showed joy in being able to help the son of the one who had generously assisted Albania in very difficult times.

However, Skanderbeg was concerned that by going to Italy with part of his army, he would leave Albania exposed to Turkish attacks, who would likely take advantage of his absence to invade the country, whose defense would have to be overseen by his lieutenants, who, although valiant, did not exercise the necessary authority over the populations in moments of danger. Therefore, Skanderbeg made an agreement with the Republic of Venice, which committed to guarding the defense of Albania's coasts and defending Skanderbeg's domains during his absence.

In June 1459[1], Skanderbeg assembled the fleet sent from Italy in Durres to transport the small expeditionary force composed of about 7,000 men, both infantry and cavalry, and with them, he set sail for Bari, where he landed at the end of June. Skanderbeg's arrival with his small army quickly changed the course of the war; the Duke of Anjou was forced to lift the siege of Bari and retreat inland. Skanderbeg, who had assumed command of the combined Albanian and Neapolitan forces, followed him incessantly with calm; brief skirmishes occurred daily, from which Skanderbeg's troops always emerged victorious. The Duke of Anjou and Jacopo Piccinino, realizing the useless attrition of their forces in this slow campaign, halted in a superior position near Ursara (now Orsara di Puglia) and awaited the enemy. The battle fought there decided the fate of the two claimants to the throne. Ferrante emerged victorious, mainly due to Skanderbeg's wise dispositions and the valor of the Albanian troops.

At the same moment Ferrante asserted his undisputed authority in Naples, expressed in subtle, tyrannical, and sometimes cruel ways, Skanderbeg continued military operations within the kingdom, subduing one by one the barons who had supported the Duke of Anjou to Ferrante's authority; he succeeded so effectively that by the following year 1560, the entire kingdom obeyed Ferrante. Nothing more kept Skanderbeg in the Kingdom of Naples; satisfied with having repaid a debt of gratitude by contributing with his valor and his troops to restoring the fortunes of his friend Alfonso d'Aragona's son and heir, he prepared to return to Albania with his army. In early May 1460, he took leave of King Ferrante, who, as a sign of living and perpetual gratitude, invested him with the title of Lord of the cities of Trani and San Giovanni Rotondo.

George Kastrioti hurried to return to his territories after learning that a Turkish army was marching rapidly towards Upper Dibra, taking advantage of his invincible leader's absence. In reality, it was two armies, one commanded by Sinan Bey and the other by Hussein Bey, targeting respectively Upper Dibra and Lower Dibra to repeat the encirclement maneuver already attempted once without success. Using the same defensive tactic that had saved him the first time, Skanderbeg attacked the two armies before they could unite, taking advantage of the precise information he had received and his perfect knowledge of the locations. Sinan Bey was defeated first, Hussein Bey was beaten and captured shortly after. Yussuf Bey, who arrived on the battlefield with another 18,000 men near Skopje in the plain of Polog, met a similar fate; his army was forced to flee by the valiant George Kastrioti.

The Alliance with Venice

Now only the heroic resistance of the Albanians prevented Mehmed II, increasingly consolidated on the Bosphorus, from also dominating the Adriatic, a magnificent base for future ventures towards Italy. But how much longer could George Kastrioti, left alone to face Mehmed II, resist? And who could help him? Skanderbeg did not trust Venice. Thus, George Kastrioti Skanderbeg offered peace to Mehmed II, and he was delighted to accept it. On April 27, 1463[2], the agreements were signed by mutual consent.

The Christian world, until then indifferent to the fate of the Albanians and their leader and with no intention of providing any help to combat the Turkish power, showed its disapproval in every way. Pius II harshly complained to Skanderbeg's envoy, who calmed his agitation by promising that his lord would be ready to take up arms if the Pope wished. Venice, which had changed its policy out of necessity, claimed that this peace had been concluded against the Republic's interests, aware that the agreement between Mehmed II and George Kastrioti was very dangerous for Venice. The Turks, who had conquered Trebizond and occupied Lesbos, were frantically reinforcing their naval fleet, ready to face the Venetian military ships, the only ones in the East that could still challenge the Crescent's advance.

In May, Bosnia was entirely occupied by the Turks. The peace concluded between Mehmed II and George Kastrioti showed its results because it left the Sultan the capacity to act in the Adriatic, and the terrible threat of Turkish arms now loomed over the city of Ragusa and the Dalmatian territory. Venice, oriented a few years earlier towards maintaining good relations with the Sultan, was preparing to organize a defensive block among all the powers frightened by the Turkish threat. Meanwhile, it armed 4,000 infantry under the command of Bertoldo D'Este, ready to offer aid to Alvise Loredan in Greece with the aim of reconquering the lost territories and, if possible, saving those in danger; using all its diplomacy to dismantle the peace between George Kastrioti and the Sultan. Not only that. It attempted to forge an alliance with the Albanian commander. Skanderbeg secretly sent to Venice the Albanian Andrea Snaticho, Abbot of Santa Maria di Rotezio, who , in the name of his leader, a promoter obecamef an alliance with the Republic.

Such an alliance could not be compared to that forged with Alfonso of Aragon. George Kastrioti needed to make an agreement with a power considered an enemy for too long, whose "Adriatic" interests clashed with those of the Albanians. Based on a precise policy, it was necessary to unite forces if they wanted to face the Sultan, who threatened to oppress both. George Kastrioti committed to resuming the war against the Turks, setting the condition of receiving economic and military aid. The economic support was to be fixed directly by the central government and not by the Venetian provveditore in Albania, while the military support had to be guaranteed by a "galea" and a Venetian ship that would annually protect the coasts between April and June - the period in which the Muslims preferred to carry out their raids on Albanian land - to safeguard the threatened populations.

Venice, for its part, given the imminent danger, would promptly send 1,000 men to Albania, both infantry and cavalry, and provide 2,000 ducats for the war. Many "galleys" would sail towards the Albanian coasts to curb a possible Turkish attack from the sea.

From the work: M. Barletius – Historia de vita et gestis Scanderbegi Epirotarum principis – Rome 1506.

Meanwhile, Venice was forming another alliance with the King of Hungary in Petervarad, committing to unite terrestrial and naval forces for a joint action against the Muslim threat. Meanwhile, in Morea, Bertoldo D'Este lost his life. For Venice, the friendship with George Kastrioti became increasingly precious. In December 1463, upon a new request from him, new guarantees were given regarding the men who would be sent and the support the Republic would grant to him and his family in case the Turk drove him out of his lands. On July 19, 1463, the Duke of Milan also endorsed the glory acquired by George Kastrioti. Once again, the Albanian appeared in Italy as the only man who could face the Turk.

When the terms of the alliance with Venice, kept highly secret, became known in Albania, various leaders of the faction opposed to the Republic cried betrayal and accused Venice of wanting to serve Mehmed II's interests by allowing him to attack George Kastrioti again. This perspective was not accurate; however, these widespread voices claimed that the Sultan would not attack the Albanians, who were so obstinate in not submitting. They wondered if it was wise to break the peace with Mehmed II to save the Republic, which had previously sought a modus vivendi at the expense of Albanian interests. Certainly, more than the Albanians and even Christianity, Venice was concerned about its own security, promoting an alliance with Skanderbeg and the peoples bordering Mehmed II to save its territories. But while these factions supported this view, they also deluded themselves into thinking that the Turks, even if they defeated Venice, would maintain peaceful relations with the Albanians, who could no longer count on the support of the King of Naples. Once again, the intervention of the Archbishop of Durres was necessary. Paolo Angelo convinced the doubters, making them approve the alliance, welcoming Gabriele Trevisano, sent by Venice to Albania with a significant amount of money to confirm all the agreements.

A pretext to break the peace with Mehmed II needed to be devised as soon as possible. The Republic of Venice, to defend its possessions in the Peloponnese, was forced in 1463 to renew hostilities against Turkey and, to avoid being alone in the fight, had sent ambassadors to the Christian princes to persuade them to join it in the war against the common enemy. The Venetian ambassador sent to Croia found Skanderbeg willing to support him, but the other Albanian princes, gathered in council to examine and discuss the Republic's proposals, unanimously rejected them, seeing no reasonable grounds to break a peace scrupulously observed by Mehmed II, which guaranteed significant advantages to all of Albania. Skanderbeg reluctantly surrendered to the council's will. The Venetian ambassador, however, went to Durres to persuade Archbishop Paolo Angelo to intervene in the matter and use his influence and advice to convince the Albanian leaders to change their minds. The Archbishop went to Croia and, in the presence of Skanderbeg, his main lieutenants, and the united princes specially convened in council, spoke in favor of an action of war. He dispensed everyone from the oath taken to break the peace with the Turk, appealing to prayers on behalf of the Supreme Pontiff and threatening the hesitant with the Church's wrath, thus managing to induce most of the attendees to decide in favor of war. Skanderbeg, who awaited nothing else, quickly gathered a good number of troops and, almost fearing his recruits might change their minds, suddenly invaded Turkish territory in April 1463, laying it waste. Such a disrespectful violation of sworn agreements by Skanderbeg surprised and greatly irritated the Muslims, who had been strict and loyal observers of the established peace. However, Mehmed II did not immediately resort to arms. Instead, he sent a messenger to Skanderbeg with a letter from Constantinople dated May 7, 1463, in which he severely reproached the Albanian leaders for their faithlessness and exhorted them, in the name of honor and conscience, not to violate the sworn agreements further. This letter, noble in content and full of lofty sentiments, would probably have produced the desired effect for Mehmed II only if, in those days, the Archbishop of Durres had not made public throughout Albania a bull from Pope Pius II urging all Albanians to break the peace with the Turk, absolving them in their consciences from the oath taken for this circumstance. On May 25, 1463, Skanderbeg responded to the Sultan with a letter declaring that peace between him and the infidels was impossible, expressing firm hope and conviction of emerging victorious in the struggle.

The pretext to break the peace with the Sultan materialized.

Partly the merit and also the responsibility of the alliance between the Republic and George Kastrioti were attributable to Pope Pius II, who saw closer the day when the dream to which he had dedicated his entire life would be realized. He dreamed of a Christian crusade against the infidel Turk.

Giovanni Santi. Pius II. Palazzo Barberini Rome. Photo Alinari.

Pope Pius II, in his religious fervor, had almost succeeded in promoting a new crusade against the Turks, inducing the Christian princes to send strong contingents of troops to Ancona, where in the spring of 1464, a large army was effectively assembled, which was to be commanded by the Doge of Venice, who, accompanied by the Pope, would land in Durres to join Skanderbeg's troops and then march on Constantinople, while the King of Hungary would simultaneously move to attack on the Danube. All this led to the belief that the grand project was ready for realization. Pius II was already in Ancona in July 1464; in early August, the Doge of Venice arrived there; the Christian army was preparing to embark on the Venetian "galleys." But at such decisive moments, the promoter, the soul of the great enterprise, the Pontiff, suddenly fell ill and died on August 14, 1464, the very day Skanderbeg achieved another victory over Turkish troops under Seremet Pasha on the Macedonian borders. The Pope's death ended the enterprise; the confederated army gathered around Ancona disbanded; the Christian princes withdrew from the league, and Skanderbeg was left alone against all the forces Mehmed II had assembled to face the crusade promoted against him by Pope Pius II.

Bibliography

"Historia e Skënderbeut," Marin Barleti. Tirana 1968.

"L’Albania ed il Principe Scanderbeg," F. Cuniberti, Roux Frassati e C° Editori, Torino 1898.

"Storia di Scanderbeg," Fan S. Noli, (translated by Francesco Argondizza), Rome 1924.

"Scanderbeg," Alessandro Cutolo, Milan 1940.

[1] On this intervention of Skanderbeg in Italy, the authors who have written about the Albanian hero disagree on the date and the war events in which he participated. Barleti and those who refer to him write that Skanderbeg went to the aid of Ferdinand in 1460. F. Cuniberti, instead, in his book "L'Albania ed il Principe Scanderbeg" argues that George Kastrioti left for Italy in 1459. He reasons: "It is uncontested that the date of the peace concluded later between Mehmed II and Skanderbeg is June 22, 1461, and that it was preceded by an exchange of letters in the preceding month of May; it is also accepted by all that, between the return from Italy and the conclusion of peace, there was a period of hostilities ended by the Albanian only in winter; such a period of hostilities must have evidently taken place in 1460 and if it occurred after Skanderbeg's return, it is also evident that he must have gone to Italy in 1459, staying there for almost a year."

[2] The date April 27, 1463, is written by A. Cutolo in his book "Scanderbeg" on page 159. Instead, F. Cuniberti states that the peace between Mehmed II and George Kastrioti was concluded on June 22, 1461. F. Cuniberti "L'Albania ed il Principe Scanderbeg" on page 93.