Athleta Christi: George Kastrioti Skanderbeg


Elton Varfi



The Season of Betrayals


At the ominous news, all of Europe trembled. In Venice, Rome, Naples, France, Spain, and England, fear and terror took hold everywhere. Everyone was aware of the danger facing the Palaiologos and his weak empire from Mehmed II, but no one had taken the initiative to seriously defend the Eastern Emperor. Everyone had hoped for some miracle to keep the Muslims from breaching the walls of the imperial city. When it became clear that the Empire was nothing but a bloody memory, and that Constantine Palaiologos had also been swept away among the victims of that fateful day, every state feared that no force could now stop the surging might of Mehmed II. Still new to misfortune, Pope Nicholas V turned to Christianity with another futile bull, pleading for the recapture of Constantinople by force of arms. Emperor Frederick III declared himself ready to lead a new crusade. Even Venice, after momentarily considering a treaty with the Sultan to save its holdings in the East, decided to take a different course. Venice understood it was no longer possible to continue its ambiguous policies and looked to the only two men who had so far tried to halt the Turkish threat: Alfonso of Aragon and George Kastrioti.
Meanwhile, with the glory of the long-desired conquest, Mehmed II declared war on all his neighbors, and every state bordering him feared for its fate.

Mehmed II by Gentile Bellini. (Layard Gallery, Venice). Photo Alinari

George Kastrioti then dared what seemed impossible. While the Albanian princes rejoiced that the fury of the Turkish armies had spared Albania, Kastrioti convened his council and proposed attacking the Muslims, declaring certain victory now that Mehmed II had Turkish troops engaged throughout the East. It was the much-desired moment to retake Sfetigrad and Berat. While Venice remained out of the conflict due to the Sultan's reassurances about its trade, the Pope and King Alfonso re-entered forcefully. The former provided aid in money, the latter sent men. If Venice, having established peace with the Sultan, neglected the Balkans, the King of Naples was ready to occupy a territory where a continuous political tradition of the Kings of Sicily called him. Alfonso of Aragon made pacts not only with Skanderbeg but also with other minor lords of Albania and Serbia. Meanwhile, in Rome, Regensburg, and Frankfurt, the best strategies to confront the Turk were being examined, but only Hunyadi and Skanderbeg thought of taking up the fight against him. On March 24, 1453, Pope Nicholas V died, and for a moment it seemed that Cardinal Alfonso Borgia, succeeding him as Callistus III, might bring to life that anti-Muslim league never achieved by the deceased pontiff. But it soon became clear that not even the new Pope could overcome the immense difficulties obstructing the success of such a daring plan. Buoyed by the support of the King of Naples, despite the opposition from other Albanian leaders, George Kastrioti moved to liberate Berat in July 1455 with 14,000 men. After a few days of siege, the Turkish commander asked for negotiations, but Kastrioti refused, trusting too much in his lucky star. Skanderbeg did not know that 40,000 men, many of them cavalry under Evernos Bey, were marching rapidly towards Berat. Indeed, Skanderbeg made several mistakes. Upon reaching Berat, Skanderbeg began bombardment and in less than two days opened a breach for his army to pass through. The Turkish commander, aiming only to buy time, attempted to negotiate the fortress’s surrender, proposing a month's truce. Skanderbeg, seeing through this ruse, knew the Turkish commander was waiting for reinforcements. Forced by his general staff, Kastrioti granted an eleven-day truce. His mistake became apparent when he left the army inactive for eleven days and departed with the royal guard to capture another fortress several miles away. The exact location of this fortress remains unknown. Skanderbeg made another error by leaving command to his brother-in-law, Charles Musacchio Thopia, an indolent young man inexperienced in military strategy. Another calamity compounded these errors. Skanderbeg's informers failed to monitor the advancing Turkish army. On July 26, 1455, Evernos Bey suddenly appeared behind the besiegers, slaughtering half, including Charles Musacchio Thopia and nearly the entire Neapolitan contingent. Skanderbeg, regaining the battlefield as the battle ended, threw himself into the fray, attempting to turn the tide, as Evernos Bey made the tactical blunder of withdrawing after victory. The defeated Albanians, facing Mehmed II's mighty hordes, felt they had overreached, forgetting their previous victories and lamenting their recent defeat. Meanwhile, in Constantinople, Mehmed II honored Evernos Bey, the first Muslim to win a pitched battle against the man who had so often defeated Islam. In Naples, Berat's defeat deepened Alfonso of Aragon's resolve to oppose the Sultan encroaching on the Adriatic. It was no longer about attacking but defending. Other powers, especially Venice, failed to understand this, clinging to the illusion of maintaining peaceful relations and secure trade with the Muslim East. Venice sought to turn the utopian dream of peace in the East into reality by recognizing the Sultan's establishment in the Empire while obligating him to resume trade with it and other Western powers. Conversely, Alfonso of Aragon, replacing the Pope as the new crusade's planner, aimed primarily to save Albania. On November 1, 1455, he convened his barons, but only the Duke of Milan appreciated the noble gesture of the King of Naples. From Naples, crossbowmen and infantry departed for Albania, tangible signs of the King's belief in his project. The King of Naples complained to the Pope about Venice’s attitude, while Skanderbeg’s situation seemed desperate. The Turks invaded Albania, destroying everything in their path. News of these events reached Italy, spreading panic and fear of greater disasters throughout Christendom. Alfonso of Aragon remained unfazed. In January 1456, Rinaldo del Duca led a contingent of infantry to Albania, and in March, Giovanni de Soto brought archers, while Captain Gisberto Rafon, recruited by the King of Naples, led Neapolitan troops. As these soldiers crossed the Adriatic, Alfonso offered rich rewards to anyone in Europe willing to join his ranks to aid George Kastrioti.

From the work: M. Barletius – Historia de vita et gestis Scanderbegi Epirotarum principis – Rome 1506


Meanwhile, a Muslim army of 15,000 soldiers, led by the renegade Moisè Comneno Thopia, advanced towards Croia. But on their way, they encountered not the sparse troops they hoped for but an army of 12,000 well-armed men from the King of Naples, bolstered by George Kastrioti's valor. Near Oranik, the two armies clashed. The battle was fought with immense bravery on both sides, and among the bravest was the traitor Moisè. But Muslim courage availed them nothing. After hours of fierce combat, they left an enormous number of dead, wounded, and prisoners on the field. Terrified by what had happened, the traitor Moisè, upon reaching Constantinople, retraced his steps and presented himself repentant before Skanderbeg, who, with his courage matched by his generosity, forgave him. Moisè's return to his ancestral lands revived a long-standing issue for George Kastrioti. Despite restoring the traitor’s private properties, he did not reinstate him fully in his fief, a policy that pleased the populace but displeased the feudal lords. On July 14, 1456, while John Hunyadi defeated a massive Turkish army under Belgrade’s walls, sent to invade Hungary, the Albanians suffered another defeat. In October, the Turks seized the fortress of Modriza not by force but by the betrayal of George Stresio Balscia, nephew of George Kastrioti. Disagreeing with his uncle's policies towards the feudal lords, he served the Sultan for a large sum of money. George Kastrioti punished him with imprisonment, sparing his life. But discontent persisted, and another, more serious betrayal followed by his nephew Hamza Kastrioti. Adding to his grievances was the birth of George Kastrioti’s son, dashing Hamza's long-cherished hope of one day succeeding in his uncle’s fiefs. Hamza left Albania with his wife and children, arriving in Constantinople to present himself to the Sultan, who was delighted to harness such hatred, envy, and rage against his great enemy. Thus, he gave Hamza a high command in the army under Isak Daut Pasha. Abandoned by almost all European princes and Venice, besieged by his own family, how could George Kastrioti resist an enemy so much stronger than himself? Two friends remained close: Alfonso of Aragon and the Pope. The former sent soldiers, the latter some financial aid, a messenger, and a bull reaffirming him as the defender of Christendom. George Kastrioti found himself facing an army of 50,000 men with only 12,000 soldiers. Furthermore, the army marching towards Albania was led by Hamza Kastrioti, who knew every road, pass, and fortress, making him the best man to thwart Skanderbeg’s strategy. George Kastrioti feigned retreat, allowing the Turkish army to advance unimpeded. Thus, on September 7, 1457, in the plain ofAlbulena near the Mati River, the Muslim army halted and encamped, weary. Everything seemed calm when suddenly, from three sides, the Albanians stormed the camp. In a short time, hundreds of Turks lay dead on the ground. Hamza Kastrioti himself was captured by Skanderbeg, who sent him to the King of Naples to be imprisoned. The Sultan’s ambassadors, sent to Croia, offered George Kastrioti peace on the condition of uti possidetis,[1] but a papal envoy arrived at the same time, urging the Albanian on behalf of the Pope to reject the offer and remain ready for the crusade Rome was organizing, with the King of Naples as the principal promoter. George Kastrioti refused the Sultan's offer and prepared for the new battle. While the enthusiasm from this new victory was still high, George Kastrioti’s father-in-law sent men to Venice to negotiate a personal peace with the Republic, willing in exchange for a pension and a position to fight any adversary of the Republic. Could Alfonso of Aragon allow his protégé to be struck again from behind by his own Albanians? If Venice openly supported the rebels, it would also be necessary to face the possibility of a naval battle against it. Alfonso of Aragon demanded and obtained that the Pope’s fleet join his and depart for Valona to await events, signaling a warning to Venice. In Naples, the Republic's secretary, Nicola Sanguntino, learned from the King himself that George Kastrioti was furious with the Republic and intended to occupy Drivasto, Antivari, Scutari, and other Venetian lands in Albania. Moreover, it was known that George Kastrioti had sent an envoy, Francesco Maramonte, to the Duke of Milan, Venice’s eternal rival, officially to outline Albania’s dire situation under the Turkish threat. But it was possible to suppose that he might also propose an alliance plan against the Republic of St. Mark.
[1] Translatable from Latin as "as you possess," indicating the maintenance of sovereignty over a territory when this has already been established in the past.



Bibliography

"Historia e Skënderbeut," Marin Barleti. Tirana 1968.

"L’Albania ed il Principe Scanderbeg," F. Cuniberti, Roux Frassati e C° Editori, Torino 1898.

"Storia di Scanderbeg," Fan S. Noli, (translated by Francesco Argondizza), Rome 1924.

"Scanderbeg," Alessandro Cutolo, Milan 1940.

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