Athleta Christi: George Kastrioti Skanderbeg

Elton Varfi

The Treaty of Gaeta

Although pleased with his victories, Skanderbeg had also learned a harsh lesson. He was now clearly the lord of Albania, especially after marrying the daughter of the Arianiti, the only leader who could oppose his hegemony in the national territory. Could the land he defended so fiercely continue to fight against the Turks for long? Could it live and prosper without the support of a great power that backed its claims, rights, and sustained its life?

Alfonso of Aragon. Triumphal Arch in Castelnuovo (Naples). Photo Alinari.

With limited agriculture and pastoral activities sufficient only for a few tribes, the forests covering the mountains proved unsuitable for any form of cultivation. The almost total absence of commerce, mainly due to the division of the territory among many feudal families, made the nation's existence very precarious.

Albania lived through its leaders, depending on the protection of one Mediterranean power or another. Since the mid-12th century, Albanian princes believed they had found their leader in Stefan Dushan, aiding him in conquering much of Macedonia. However, soon after, the Albanians, intolerant of the rule of Stefan Dushan, a Serb by birth and foreign in habits, fought him so fiercely that he renounced his command over them. But before that, he ceded many of the lands he ruled to Venice and donated others to local lords, thus placing Albania within the sphere of the Republic’s interests on one side and at the mercy of fragmented feudalism on the other.

All Albanian princes showed a desire to command, vying for supremacy among themselves. Throughout the 1300s, the Thopia supported the Angevin of Naples, hoping to dominate other families; the Dukagjini, enemies of Venice, were always at war with the Castriot; the Balsha, after years of struggle with Venice, became vassals of the Castriot; the Zaccaria, the Konina, the Spano, the Musacchi, who after uncertain policies decided to pursue Albania's welfare, putting aside personal interests; the Arianiti, who became loyal supporters of George Castriot only after one of their women married him.

Disbanding that embryonic state organization represented by the League of Lezhe fell within the political lines of Venice, concerned with hindering any power that might firmly establish itself on the Adriatic. While various lords of very small territories welcomed support from the Serenissima in every way, Skanderbeg, trying to unite these scattered groups and create an organization with them, knew Venice would be hostile to him at every opportunity.

It would have been highly imprudent for George Castriot to hope that the threat of a Turkish attack would push Venice out of its original line of conduct. Thus, convinced that Albania could not survive without the protection of a great friendly state, he turned to the only sovereign aiming eastward: Alfonso of Aragon, who in times of danger could be a reliable and determined ally.

Alfonso of Aragon, more than all his contemporary princes, not only understood the Turkish danger but also harbored aspirations inherited from the kings who preceded him on the throne of Naples. These aspirations led him to consider the East, especially Constantinople, as land to conquer. The Sultan did not pose a concrete threat to Venetian interests in the East; instead, by aiding their trade, respecting their ships, and encouraging their commerce, he seemed to want to establish a state of affairs where the two powers had found a modus vivendi. So to whom else should George Castriot turn when Venice refused to help him in the fight against the Sultan?

An enemy of Islam as much as, and perhaps even more than, the Albanians, Alfonso of Aragon became the natural protector of George Castriot. True, he involved the Albanians in a dangerous policy that set them against not only the Turks but also the Venetians, but he gave them the support of a great kingdom, making them hope that the Pope and the sovereigns of Spain, indifferent to Skanderbeg's pleas, would no longer be so when the struggle was led by a man reputedly the most representative prince among the powerful Italians.

In March 1451, Stefano, bishop of Croia, and the Dominican Nicola de Berguzzi reached the court of Naples as Skanderbeg's ambassadors. The Albanian leader feared that the resumption of hostilities by the Turks was near and felt that alone he could no longer resist a second attack, so he placed himself and his people under the protection of the great King. This time, it was not a simple alliance treaty between two powers. George Castriot renounced the dream of ruling all of Albania alone and no longer sought help from King Alfonso as an equal but recognized his supreme authority, which had become a reason for Albania's existence.

In the treaty concluded and signed in Gaeta on March 26, 1451, the envoys offered to George Castriot, on behalf of their lord and those who obeyed them, Croia and other minor possessions, provided the King of Naples sent his troops to defend the region. They also pledged to recognize the supreme lordship of the King of Naples over all the conquests that Skanderbeg would make with his help, assuring that Skanderbeg, expelled from the Turks' hands, would personally come to the place designated by Alfonso to pay him homage of loyalty and submission. On his part, the King of Naples committed not only to sending the necessary soldiers but also to respecting the privileges granted to Croia and those already enjoyed by the lords who had submitted to him.

This was not a real transfer of powers because the treaty did not touch on the governing prerogatives of George Castriot and the other Albanian leaders, but the Gaeta agreement placed the two contracting parties on two different levels, decidedly placing Albanian politics under the dependency of the King of Naples. With these pacts and others nearly similar, signed on February 5, 1451, with Demetrios Palaiologos, Despot of Morea, Alfonso secured a solid base beyond the Adriatic, giving him, for the moment, a decisive dominance in the eastern Mediterranean basin and paving his way towards Constantinople, which he hoped to liberate from the Turkish threat not because the Palaiologos ruled there, but so he himself could command over all the Mediterranean East at Venice's expense.

The Fall of Constantinople

The effects of the treaty with the Neapolitans soon became evident. The Albanian ambassadors who appeared before Pope Nicholas V returned not with material aid but at least with a plenary indulgence for all Christians who went to fight under the Albanian banner.

Venice, realizing that the Treaty of Gaeta was directed not only against the Ottomans but also against its supremacy in the East, showed it understood the game of the King of Naples when, on a slight pretext, it decided to stop paying the pension to which George Castriot was entitled under the 1448 peace. On June 7, George Arianiti also recognized the supremacy of the King of Naples over his lands.

In May 1441, Bernardo Vaquer departed from Naples for Albania at the head of a contingent of men with orders to bring Skanderbeg supplies and weapons and to oversee the rebuilding of the walls of Croia. He was also asked to provide an exact geographical description of the country, its resources, and its potential.

In Albania, not everyone looked favorably on the arrival of the Neapolitan delegate. The old feuds between George Castriot and some ancient feudal families, deliberately kept alive by Venice, which represented the typical Albanian aversion to the foreigner, especially one who came as a ruler, made Bernardo Vaquer's task anything but easy.

Skanderbeg (detail). From the work: M. Barletius - Historia de vita et gestis Scanderbegi Epirotarum principis - Rome 1506.

George Castriot himself experienced the hostility of his compatriots when he summoned the league of princes, proposing they attack Sfetigrad and Berat. Despite demonstrating to the participants that the Albanian army had grown thanks to volunteers and was supported with money from the Pope and the King of Naples, showing itself strong and suited for war, the princes refused. But if this opposition was latent and only aimed to sabotage George Castriot's project, the aversion of some lords of the Dukagjini house was openly displayed.

Many of them, long in the pay of Venice and tied to its policy, harbored such hatred toward Skanderbeg that they openly contacted the Sultan, following even in this the will of the Serenissima, which preferred Ottoman supremacy in the Balkans to that of Naples. When Alfonso of Aragon learned of these events, dividing Albania into two opposing political factions, one favoring Venice and the other George Castriot, he sought the Pope's help so that part of the Albanians would not dare, out of hatred for Skanderbeg, support the infidel.

Albania no longer unanimously obeyed the word of its great leader; a blind parochialism prevented some from understanding the profound political sense in George Castriot's work, who cleverly placed himself in the wake of the only prince who best interpreted eastern problems. For the Albanians, his protection represented the true guarantee of existence and the final victory over the Turk.

Alfonso of Aragon energetically nurtured the relationship with his allies. He sent new contingents of troops and gifts to George Castriot, as well as aid to the populations. He certainly did not forget that Venetian attitudes significantly influenced Albanian politics. The Dukagjini, for example, on whom the severe spiritual sanction threatened by Pope Nicholas V against them hadno effect, would not have dared to openly oppose Skanderbeg without the support of the Serenissima.

Alfonso of Aragon decided to confront the Doge on the unprecedented behavior of his subjects, both Christian and Albanian, who allied with the infidel enemy of their land while George Castriot, supported by the Neapolitans, was preparing again to face him.

Mehmed II, too busy completing the conquest of Constantinople, had not concerned himself with Albania or its leader for some time, especially since many Ottoman soldiers were engaged in the campaign against the rebel Ibrahim Bey, Emir of Karaman. But when he learned of the treaty concluded by Alfonso of Aragon and understood that a coalition was forming behind his back, in which, fortunately for him, Venice was not involved, he wanted to act preemptively to avoid being attacked. In short, he tried to settle the Albanian issue before dealing with the much more serious one that would guarantee him the control of Constantinople.

In the summer of 1452, two armies under the command of Tali Pasha marched towards Albania to put Skanderbeg and his people between two fires. Hamza Bey, leading 10,000 men, approached the fortress of Modriza, where the Albanian was entrenched with 4,000 soldiers, and faced him on July 21, hoping that Tali Pasha, with the rest of the army, would surprise the Albanians from behind during the battle. But the battle lasted much less than Hamza Bey thought. The Turks, attacked with unheard-of violence, fled in disarray, leaving behind dead, wounded, and prisoners, including Hamza Bey himself. When Tali Pasha arrived in the Mezadi valley to surprise George Castriot, he found himself facing an entire army jubilant from the recent victory, carrying with them the bound Hamza Bey and other captive officers in the front row.

Tali Pasha did not retreat, especially since he was followed by 25,000 well-armed men, but after a few hours, the Turkish army was again in flight. Tali Pasha was killed in combat by Moisè Dibra. These victories restored George Castriot's prestige throughout Albania. Seizing the favorable moment, Nicholas V tasked Paolo Angeli, bishop of Drivasto, with bringing the Dukagjini back on the right path.

On October 25, 1452, in Durazzo, in the presence of the Venetian commander, the Dukagjini made peace, at least for the moment, with George Castriot. But how little Alfonso of Aragon and George Castriot trusted Venice's good intentions was demonstrated in March of the following year when the King of Naples directly asked the Doge to clarify his policy. Why did the Serenissima no longer pay the Albanian prince the annual pension of 1,400 ducats solemnly promised in 1448? Why had it not only given refuge to the Dukagjini during their defection but also helped their approaches to the Turks? Why did it not also participate in reconciling the Albanian princes? Why did it not also provide financial aid to the Albanian engaged against the Turks who threatened not only him but all of Christendom?

While Venice prepared to respond to these precise and pressing questions, other events were unfolding, aiming to disrupt the entire balance of Christendom. In April 1453, Mehmed II, who did not dare attack Constantinople leaving the Albanians and Neapolitans, heartened by the two victories of the previous year, entrusted Ibrahim Bey with marching on Albania, hoping for better fortune than Tali Pasha. George Castriot, informed of the presence of a large army – which only later was known to be heading towards Constantinople – left Adrianople. Skanderbeg feared they were coming to invade Albania. He then decided to attack beyond the borders in the Pollogo plain, taking Uskub. The clash took place on April 22, 1453. The battle turned into a massacre. Just as Tali Pasha had fallen, so did Ibrahim Bey. The news of this great victory once again rejoiced Europe.

But Christendom had little time to enjoy this success. A month later, on May 29, 1453, Constantinople fell.

Bibliography

"Historia e Skënderbeut," Marin Barleti. Tirana 1968.

"L’Albania ed il Principe Scanderbeg," F. Cuniberti, Roux Frassati e C° Editori, Torino 1898.

"Storia di Scanderbeg," Fan S. Noli, (translated by Francesco Argondizza), Rome 1924.

"Scanderbeg," Alessandro Cutolo, Milan 1940.