The Dramatic Adventure of the Italians in Albania[1]

by Emilio Faldella

Twice occupied by our Expeditionary Forces, first in 1914-15 and then in 1939, Albania served as the launchpad for Mussolini's "absurd war" against Greece. In the rain, along muddy trails, across swollen streams, alpine troops and sharpshooters rushed headlong into the relentless fire of mortars.

On December 29, 1914, the 10th sharpshooters regiment and the 18th mounted battery landed in Vlorë. Thus began the first act of the Albanian adventure, which would sadly conclude in 1920. Minister of Foreign Affairs Sonnino had wanted this takeover for an exclusively political purpose; General Cadorna had expressed his opposition, foreseeing that defending Vlorë and its port in case of need would require many more troops.

In November 1915, the defeated Serbian army retreated towards the Adriatic. To aid, gather, and evacuate them, two brigades (Savona and Verona), two territorial militia regiments, a cavalry squadron, five mountain and field batteries, and seven stationary batteries were sent to Albania under the command of General Bertotti.

The Serbian army poured in from Montenegro and Northern Albania in pitiable conditions, dragging along Austrian prisoners, civilians, and officers' families: a mass of people weakened by hunger, fatigue, illness, and the harsh climate. They needed food and care. It became necessary to occupy Durrës with a column (led by General Guerrini) comprised of the 15th infantry (Savona) and two mountain batteries. Marching 120 kilometers through swampy terrain, devoid of roads, crossed by bridgeless rivers, they reached the port on December 20, 1915.

In the labyrinth of World War I, a decree issued on December 4th unsettled the chain of command. The Occupation Corps of Albania, led by General Bertotti, was abruptly shifted from the jurisdiction of General Cadorna to fall under the purview of the Minister of War. The repercussions were calamitous. Bertotti proved to be lamentably compliant with the political ambitions of the government, ambitions that egregiously clashed with the imperative of aiding the beleaguered Serbian army with minimal resource expenditure.

By the waning days of December, Serbian troops began to flood into Albania. Hastily improvised hospitals, supply depots, and camps were established to cater to their logistical and medical needs. Initially, the evacuation was launched from the port of San Giovanni di Medua. However, as enemy forces closed in, the port became untenable, redirecting the flood of refugees toward Durazzo and Valona. Collectively, the Italian navy, with limited support from British and French ships, transported 193,514 men and 10,153 animals to Corfu and Brindisi—an enormous undertaking that initially garnered acclaim and gratitude but was eventually forgotten.

Durazzo port was particularly vulnerable to an attack by the advancing Austro-Hungarian forces that were hot on the heels of the Serbian rearguard. Hence, by February 9, 1916, after the successful evacuation of 88,153 men, it would have been prudent, as Cadorna had suggested and General Giacinto Ferrero had proposed, to voluntarily vacate the port. The required defense would have necessitated significant troop deployment.

However, General Bertotti, prioritizing the government's political whims over military necessities, vehemently opposed the move. He ordered General Ferrero to defend Durazzo at all costs. Ferrero, a man of unyielding character and a general of great skill and prestige, made extraordinary efforts to mitigate the inevitable repercussions of this ill-advised command. Following a tenacious and honorable resistance against overwhelming forces on February 23rd, executed over a 42 km front by the Savona Brigade, a battalion of the 86th Infantry, an M.T. battalion, a cavalry platoon, an engineering platoon, and 30 artillery pieces, Ferrero skillfully orchestrated the final evacuation of troops, completed on February 26th.

Fearing that the Austrians would advance as far as Valona, three divisions were sent to Albania, forming the XVI Army Corps under the leadership of General Piacentini. These included the 43rd and 44th Divisions (Marche, Puglie, Tanaro, and Arno Brigades), the Catania Light Cavalry Regiment, the 38th M.T. Regiment, and twenty-one artillery batteries. A command for the 38th Division was established on site. As the Austrians did not proceed toward Valona, many of these troops were repatriated between May and June of 1916. General Bandini replaced General Piacentini, who was appointed as the commander of the 5th Army.

Even before the Italian landing, Greece had occupied part of southern Albania to support its irredentist aspirations and did not evacuate the area even when the Allies demanded it in August 1916. Consequently, operations were carried out in the fall to force the Greeks to withdraw, as the Allies had committed to guaranteeing Albania's independence.

After the death of General Bandini on December 11, 1916, due to the sinking of the battleship Regina Margherita, General Giacinto Ferrero succeeded him. Operations were undertaken in the Cerevola-Tomori area in May 1918 to coordinate with allied forces operating in Macedonia. After evaluating the opportunity to occupy the Mallakastra massif and reach the Semeni River to secure Valona, an offensive was launched against Austro-Hungarian forces in July.

1- Gen. Bertotti commanded the Occupation Corps.

2 - Gen. Ferrero oversaw the evacuation of Durres.

On July 7, 1918, the Catania and Palermo cavalry regiments, along with a squadron from Lucca, advanced into the Fieri plain, surrounding the Malakastra from the north and reaching the Semeni on the 9th; subsequently, Berat was occupied. The Austro-Hungarian High Command, led by General Pflanzer Baltin, organized a counteroffensive in August against the 23 Italian battalions, reduced to 8,000 men due to malaria. Although they managed to push back some forward elements, the situation eventually stabilized.

At the end of September 1918, General Ferrero launched an offensive. On September 30, the cavalry reached the Skumbi River; on October 7, the Palermo Brigade entered Elbasan; Durres was occupied on the 14th, and Tirana on the 15th. On October 31, Austro-Hungarian troops defending Scutari were attacked, forcing them to withdraw.

By the end of the war, Albania was almost entirely under the control of Italian troops, who had the task, in agreement with the Allies, of ensuring Albania's independence. However, neighboring states fomented a rebellion that gradually gained ground.

On the morning of April 8, General Guzzoni, the commander of the Expeditionary Corps, arrived in Tirana along with Column Messe. Shortly thereafter, aircraft landed, bringing with them two battalions of the 3rd Grenadiers under Colonel Mannerini. By April 12, a significant portion of Albanian territory was already under occupation. Additional forces subsequently arrived in Albania: four infantry divisions, one alpine division, and one armored division. During the winter of 1939-40, one of the infantry divisions was recalled to Italy.

In the summer of 1940, aspirations emerged in Rome to wage war against Greece. These ambitions were quashed in August, thanks to the intervention of Ribbentrop. Two months later, between October 12 and 15, Mussolini decided, under well-known circumstances, to commence hostilities on October 28. A war plan against Greece, originally devised by General Guzzoni at the behest of the Ministry of War, called for the deployment of twenty divisions—eighteen to be stationed in Albania and two in Italy—for the occupation of the Ionian Islands.

In July 1940, General Geloso was tasked with developing a plan to occupy only Northern Epirus (Chameria), provided that the bulk of the Greek army was engaged against Bulgaria, or that Greece would permit the occupation of Epirus. Despite relying on such favorable conditions, Geloso estimated that eleven divisions, one grenadier regiment, and two cavalry regiments would be necessary. The General Staff modified the plan, believing that eight divisions and a "Grouping" of miscellaneous units—grenadiers, cavalry, etc.—would suffice, but only if Greece consented, or the majority of the Greek army was engaged against Bulgaria.

General Visconti Prasca, commander of the troops in Albania, had already assured Mussolini and Ciano that he was prepared to execute any operation he was ordered to carry out. He reiterated this during a meeting at the Palazzo Venezia on October 15, 1940, when Mussolini announced the decision to attack Greece. Marshal Badoglio did not object; rather, he stated that Visconti Prasca's plan was sound. This plan was similar to the one from the General Staff, with the difference being the initial deployment of troops along a 100-kilometer front as opposed to a maximum 30-kilometer front. Two divisions were stationed defensively in Korçë, and two more at the border with Yugoslavia.

Beyond these specifics, Visconti Prasca agreed to attack under any circumstances, even if the conditions set by the General Staff were not met. No one considered that Greece, if attacked, would react with full force, and that even if Italian forces initially enjoyed numerical superiority, the situation would soon reverse. The 14 already-mobilized Greek divisions could reinforce the theater of war much more rapidly than divisions coming from Italy across the Adriatic.

Italian troops landing at Vlorë in December 1914, coming to the aid of the retreating Serbian army.

An intelligent and fierce enemy of Italy could probably not have put the Italian Army in a worse situation to undertake such a senseless task. Ten days before the campaign began, the Army was in a satisfactory state of readiness; after more than a year of mobilization since September 1939, both the regiments and divisions were in excellent shape. Officers and troops were well-coordinated; discipline was excellent, and even the training was satisfactory. While the troops in Albania crossed the border into Greece, all the divisions that were in Italy were disintegrating, due to the demobilization ordered by Mussolini. General Soddu, the Undersecretary of War, refused to oppose this move so as not to displease Mussolini, and Badoglio avoided opposing it as well. Entire age classes were discharged; many units, including all the Alpine "valley" battalions, were even disbanded. One circular telegram between October 15 and 20, canceling the demobilization order—which had not yet been executed—could have prevented all this.

Infantrymen landing at an Albanian port in 1940. The attack on Greece commenced on October 28.

It would not have been possible to start a war campaign under worse conditions: a notoriously unfavorable season for operations in the Balkans; inferior forces compared to the enemy and an inability to reinforce them quickly; the ongoing disarray afflicting the Army due to demobilization; and the recklessness of General Visconti Prasca, unable to realistically assess the difficulties, all for the sake of pleasing Mussolini and commencing the war immediately, before being placed under a more competent higher-ranking general.

Under relentless rain, on muddy roads and paths, crossing torrents in full spate, the Greek border was crossed at dawn on October 28th, initiating what was aptly termed an 'absurd war'. The XXV Army Corps (Gen. Carlo Rossi) launched an offensive towards Ioannina with three divisions. On its right flank was the 'Coastal Group,' equivalent to a division, and to the left, somewhat distantly, was the Alpine Division Julia, comprising only five battalions and five artillery batteries. The XXVI Army Corps (Gen. Nasci) with two divisions had a defensive role in the area around Korçë. Initially, the Greek forces were scant, but soon enough, additional, numerous forces poured in from the rear; they mounted an insurmountable resistance at Kalpaki and along the Kalamas River against the XXV Corps and enveloped the left flank of the Julia Division, which had daringly advanced into the mountainous Pindus range with the objective of reaching Metsovo, forcing it into extremely challenging combat due to supply exhaustion.

The 'Coastal Group' threw a bridge over the swelling Kalamas River and advanced to Plataria, while the Milan cavalry regiment audaciously pushed forward to Margariti. The unsustainable situation of the Julia Division, the impossibility of breaking through the blockade at Kalpaki despite violent attacks carried out continuously by the Ferrara, Siena, and Centauro divisions of the XXV Corps from November 1 to 7, the influx of numerous Greek forces against the XXVI Corps in Korçë, where the Parma and Piemonte divisions were deployed along a 50-kilometer front, and the complete defection of the Albanian troops, which exacerbated the situation, forced the High Command to order the suspension of the offensive. The impact of these events in Rome was profound.

On November 5, Gen. Soddu arrived in Albania with the task, which he had offered to Mussolini, of rectifying the situation by assuming command of an 'army group' consisting of two armies, each with two corps. While it was easy to establish commands, it was impossible to allocate troops. In Italy, the Bari Division, which was initially intended to land in Corfu, was immediately transported to Albania between November 1 and 5, and thrown into the furnace. Due to its original task, it lacked supply wagons. Three Bersaglieri regiments (1st, 2nd, 4th) were also sent by air and sea. Meanwhile, divisions that had been imprudently demobilized fifteen days earlier were hastily reconstituted, drawing elements from all over, so that previously compact regiments and battalions were hastily cobbled together, with recalled officers and troops of various origins. Bad weather at sea delayed the transports.

After the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Bersaglieri regiments, the Alpine Division Tridentina arrived in Albania between November 10 and 15. Two battalions that arrived by air on the 12th were already in line on the upper Devoll by the 13th; they were followed by the newly reconstituted Modena Division, three 'valley' Alpine battalions, and the Taro Division from November 15 to 20. Meanwhile, the XXVI Corps, although reinforced by the Venezia Division, which had made a long march from the border with Yugoslavia, had been repelled from Korçë and forced to retreat along the Devoll valley. The XXV Corps, slowly yielding ground, was resisting the counter-offensive, still remaining on Greek soil. But on its left flank, the enemy was pressing hard in the Perati-Ersekë area, at the center of the front. Against the XXV Army Corps and the 'Coastal Group,' six Greek divisions were deployed, and against the XXVI Corps, five. Considering that Italian divisions had two regiments and the Greek ones had three, the disparity in forces was glaringly evident, especially since the Greeks still had divisions in the process of arriving. The divisions that were arriving in Albania could not perform satisfactorily because the need to make maximum use of the cargo capacity of the ships required loading the men on one steamer, the animals on another, and the cannons on yet another; sometimes the men were sent by air and landed at the airports with only their individual armament.

Soldiers from the Bari Division navigate a muddy road in Epirus.

It would have been essential to reorganize the units before deploying them; instead, the situation at the front, teetering on disaster, necessitated hastily loading the newly arrived units onto trucks and sending them to the front lines, even if they were without heavy weapons, artillery, or supply wagons. The result was a jumbled mixture of units that took considerable effort to untangle and significantly reduced the operational capacity of the reinforcement troops. Under the command of High Command (Gen. Soddu), there were two army commands: the 11th in the north (Vercellino) and the 9th in the south (Geloso). On the far left flank, the III Corps (Arisio) was in action; straddling the Devoll River was the XXVI Corps (Nasci).

The Greeks continued their offensive into December, especially against the Tridentina Division, which was reinforced in the last ten days of the month by the 1st Alpine (Cuneense). To the right of the XXVI, the command of the VIII Corps (Bancale) was inserted into the sector that included the valleys of the Osum and Vjosa rivers. The enemy pressure against the Julia and Bari Divisions and the Bersaglieri regiments was intense. Our troops had to resist attacks from superior forces on improvised lines, with wide gaps between units, no reserves, and scarce supplies due to a lack of supply wagons.

The units were by now weakened due to combat losses and illness, so the terms 'regiments,' 'battalions,' and 'companies' no longer corresponded to the actual strength of the units. The so-called 'line' was nothing more than a series of small groups of men, far apart, separated by wide intervals, and unprotected. It's no surprise that under such conditions, the enemy forced successive retreats, particularly pronounced between the Osum and Vjosa rivers. The XXV Corps remained on the border line until early December and then also had to retreat, engaging in fierce combat, in which the 2nd Bersaglieri distinguished itself.

During December, the Ferrara and part of the Modena Divisions had to withdraw from the Kurvelesh massif, connecting to the line of resistance where the Special Army Corps (Messe), formed with the 'Coastal Group' and a 'special' division (Piazzoni), had been forced to retreat. The line reached by retreating at the end of December was, overall, the furthest line reached as a result of the Greek counter-offensive, as in January and February, despite persistently attacking, the Greeks only achieved limited local successes.

By the end of the month, the battle 'for Vlorë,' which had been the Greeks' objective, could be considered concluded. During December, three more infantry divisions (Acqui, Cuneo, Brennero) and two Alpine divisions (Pusteria and Cuneense) had arrived, but the troops deployed up to that point were so exhausted and reduced in strength that these new units could barely add more substance to the already weak defensive front. They certainly could not constitute, as Mussolini would have liked, a force for a counter-offensive, which was unthinkable as long as it was necessary to hurriedly deploy incoming units day by day to plug fearful gaps and resort to the most irrational expedients to prevent the enemy from breaking through.

It is difficult for those who did not experience those events to comprehend the immense task of the Army in November and December of 1940. The aim was to remedy, while fighting under disastrous conditions, the consequences of the recklessness shown by the main culprits: Mussolini, Ciano, Badoglio, Soddu, and Visconti Prasca. It was a confrontation with an enemy superior in number, courageous, and animated by the highest morale.

Marshal Badoglio had resigned, and Mussolini had designated General Cavallero to replace him as Chief of General Staff. On December 4th, General Soddu telephoned General Guzzoni, the Undersecretary of War and Deputy Chief of General Staff, expressing doubt about the ability to resist. Mussolini immediately sent Cavallero to Albania to join Soddu, whom he then replaced on December 29th.

During January, the Greeks did not insist on an offensive against the III and XXVI Corps. However, in February, they attacked insistently at Guri i Topit, in the Devoll Valley, but without being able to shake the solid resistance of the 5th Alpine. During January, the offensive persisted in the Osum sector, entrusted to the IV Corps (Mercalli), and the Vjosa (VIII Corps). Despite fierce resistance and counterattacks, it became necessary to retreat to the Klisura area and further north. Nonetheless, this battle, which came to be known as the "Battle for Berat"—since this was the objective of the Greek command—ultimately concluded in favor of the defenders.

In the last ten days of January, the XXV Corps attempted a counteroffensive to retake Klisura. After initial successes, the attacking troops were forced to halt and withdraw. However, they succeeded in drawing Greek forces into the Vjosa Valley, preventing the enemy from persisting in their offensive against the IV and VIII Corps.

By now, the Greek army had made its maximum effort; the objectives it aspired to—Elbasan, Berat, Vlorë—were now beyond its reach. Nevertheless, Greek command decided to try for the capture of the Tepelenë hub, aiming for a resonating success and to eliminate a favorable base for an Italian offensive. The battle for Tepelenë began on February 10 and concluded only in mid-March, with the full success of the XXV Corps. The Greeks engaged six divisions, including the famed 5th "Crete," against the Julia Division, remnants of the 1st Alpine Group "Valle," the 2nd Bersaglieri, a battalion of grenadiers, a regiment from the Sforzesca Division, a Blackshirt detachment, and three undivided alpine battalions (Susa, Cervino, Val Cismon). The final Greek offensive was halted at Golico and Scindeli.

Meanwhile, Mussolini had managed to compel Cavallero to undertake an offensive, confident of its success and entrusting its execution to General Gambara, who had replaced Bancale in the VIII Corps. This was not the time to go on the offensive; the conditions for achieving a decisive result had not yet been created, and a partial success would have resulted in a needless waste of resources. By waiting for the German army to be ready for action, the hostilities would have ended with a victory that would erase the disappointments suffered thus far. This was the opinion of General Guzzoni, which Mussolini ignored; General Cavallero, although having wiser intentions, did not want to oppose Mussolini's will. Thus, on March 9, while the Greeks were still attacking in the Vjosa Valley, the IV and VIII Corps went on the offensive.

MUSSOLINI at the Greek front in March 1941 discussing operational plans with Cavallero.

The VIII Corps (Gambara) was at the center with the Cagliari, Puglie, and Pinerolo Divisions; the IV Corps (Mercalli) was on the left with the Pusteria and Cacciatori delle Alpi Divisions, and on the right was a part of the XXV Corps (Sforzesca Division and Alpine Group Signorini). Despite the valor of the troops, the results were very limited; the Greeks had solidly fortified that sector and staffed it with excellent divisions. The fierce and bloody fight, resumed at dawn on March 10, continued until March 15, with the intervention of the Bari Division as well, but yielded no results. If several Greek regiments were worn out, the wear and tear on seven of our divisions and the 15,000 losses prevented the formation of a shock mass on the left wing of the formation, with which Cavallero would have wanted to outflank the enemy in the final offensive.

To the failures incurred by the absurd decision to wage war on Greece with insufficient forces, another failure was added that could have been avoided. The Army thus had to endure this harsh ordeal as well, which it endured with the self-sacrifice displayed throughout the campaign. The hard struggle on the mountains of Albania can only be compared, in terms of sacrifice, valor, and difficulty, to the stopping battle on Grappa, which took place in November-December 1917.

When Yugoslavia adopted a hostile stance towards the Axis on March 27, Cavallero had to reorganize the defense on the Yugoslav border as well. He established the XVII Corps (Pafundi) in the direction of Shkodër with the Centauro, Puglie, and Messina Divisions. He entrusted General Nasci with the task to... Acting along the Elbasan-Dibra axis, he reinforced the left wing of the 11th Army and established the XIV Corps (Vecchi), which he positioned in reserve. With the onset of the German offensive against Yugoslavia, in which the Italian 2nd Army from Venezia Giulia also participated, Yugoslav divisions attempted to penetrate Albania but were repelled. On April 6, the Germans entered Greek territory. Despite initial difficulties in overcoming border fortifications, they were able to advance rapidly since the Greek army remained engaged against the Italian forces. In fact, when the offensive began on April 9, fierce battles had to be fought, succeeding in penetrating Greek territory only after overcoming tenacious resistance in the areas of Erseke, Perati, Kakavia, and Delvinaki.

The armistice signed on April 24 in Thessaloniki brought an end to the operations. The losses incurred during the campaign amounted to 16,674 dead, of which 2,803 were considered missing; 50,000 wounded and 12,000 frostbitten. Among those who fell, sharing the sacrifice with the valorous soldiers, were 9 colonels, about a hundred senior officers, and a thousand junior officers.

After the conclusion of the conflict, no military events of particular significance occurred in Albania, although from the summer of 1942 onwards, the organization of an uprising among the Albanians was revealed by assassinations, attacks on isolated posts, and sabotage. The armistice of September 8, 1943, brought an end to the long cycle of Italian military operations in Albania, which had begun as far back as December 1914. The memory of the severe disappointments must not make us forget that the Italian soldier acted with self-sacrifice and a spirit of sacrifice.

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