April 7, 1939: Fascist Italy Occupies Albania
Fascist Italy Occupies Albania
Elton A. Varfi
Rome, 1938. A man sits in his office, depressed and on the verge of a nervous breakdown. He is waiting for the arrival of a prince, but as usual, once again, the prince has been sent to Rome after the fact. This is precisely the torment that afflicts the man.
Ahmet Zogolli belonged to a dynasty of mafia leaders from Mat. The Zogolli family, who were among the first to convert to Islam after the Turkish occupation, had asserted their power over the region thanks to the protection of the Pashas, who successively governed the country in the name of the sultan. They owned sheep, some pastures, and a band of hitmen whom they used to establish their small feudal rule and regulate feuds and guerrilla warfare as they pleased.
Ahmet Zogolli, born in 1895, had studied at the Military Academy in Constantinople, but when Albania came under Viennese control after the Balkan wars, he transferred to the Austrian army, where he became a colonel. Discharged at the end of World War I, he found himself without military rank, flag, or money and returned to Mat, never resigned to stay there like his ancestors.
The peace treaties that had imposed a democratic regime in Albania were drawn up only to placate public opinion. For Ahmed, his name was enough to become a deputy of his district, but his ambition was soon served by the hereditary cunning of the Zogolli family, remarkable courage, and a total lack of scruples. At just thirty, he became Minister of the Interior, a position he used to multiply his friends and persecute his enemies. Soon after, he took over the Presidency of the Council. When he was defeated in the next elections by the liberal Fan Noli, he refused to give up his position and tried to establish a dictatorship but failed due to a lack of internal strength and external support. Forced to flee, he sought refuge in Belgrade.
1895 - 1961
Galeazzo Ciano, born in Livorno in 1903, son of a count, married Edda Mussolini in 1930, and in 1936 Mussolini appointed his son-in-law as Foreign Minister, replacing him. Count Ciano's ambitions toward Albania were not hidden. On August 25, 1937, he wrote in his diary:
"I persuaded the Duce to give 60 million lire, over four years, to Albania for various works. My trip to Tirana convinced me of the need to thoroughly oversee that sector. We need to establish stable centers of Italian interest. Who knows what the future holds? We must be ready to seize the opportunities that will arise. We will not withdraw as we did in 1920. In the south, we have absorbed several hundred thousand Albanians. Why shouldn't the same happen on the other shore, along the Adriatic?"
The man waiting for the prince in his office is a dictator. In fact, he has proclaimed himself "DVX," the Duce of Fascism. His name is Benito Mussolini. He is in a bad mood and irritable because Adolf Hitler, his ally, has just annexed Czechoslovakia to Germany without involving him. Prince Philipp of Hesse was sent to Rome with a personal message from Hitler to the Duce. However, the brevity of the explanation—Philipp of Hesse was instructed to provide only a verbal justification for the new German move—and the unconvincing content increased rather than placated the Italian dictator's discontent. With his journalistic instinct, the Duce did not even want to report the prince's visit.
"Italians would laugh at me; every time Hitler takes a state, he sends me a message," Mussolini allegedly exclaimed. But a public gesture of disapproval at that moment would have signified a political defeat. Ciano became even more irritated than his father-in-law. He had outwardly accepted the German maneuver "to avoid pleasing God and his enemies[1]." However, Mussolini and his son-in-law wanted to soften the humiliation with a counter-move. Ciano possessed considerable intelligence but little imagination.
Thus, an Italian success was needed to counterbalance the German one. The “piece” of land to conquer, without much effort, and to place on the propaganda scales to prevent them from tipping too much in Hitler's favor, was there. It was called Albania. The revenge was not the most ideal. In the small Balkan state, Italy already had internationally recognized influence, bought with substantial economic aid. But Albania was independent and quite reluctant to be fully annexed. Therefore, it was easily conquerable.
The interests of the fascist government in Albania were clear from the outset. The action of fascist Italy was decisive for the economic reconstruction of Albania.
Economic relations between the two states were conventionally established with the trade and navigation treaty signed on January 20, 1924, followed by the establishment and consular conventions, signed a few months later (February 29, 1924). Since then, Italy, through successive agreements, progressively increased imports from Albania, almost entirely absorbing its production, even though its quality was not easily marketable in Italy. Exports did not achieve the same result, as Albania continued to import from other countries, and only in recent years—when Italy established the policy of quotas and balanced exchanges—did imports from Italy grow significantly.
From 1925 to 1939, a total of two billion lire were invested in Albanian territory, with numerous initiatives driven by Italy. In a speech delivered in the Chamber on April 15, 1939, Count Ciano himself declared: “Everything that has been accomplished in Albania in the last fifteen years is exclusively linked to the name of Italy. Italian labor and capital, with the assistance of excellent Albanian workers, have built ports, laid roads, reclaimed lands, drilled wells, and explored mines.”
Ahmet Zog, who in the meantime had changed his surname, quickly regained power with the help of both the Yugoslavs and the Italians and crowned himself President of the Republic. But he was not content; three years later, he wanted a real crown, that of King, and Mussolini granted it to him in exchange for a promise of eternal loyalty to Italy, which, coming from a man like Zog, was worth very little. Mussolini’s action soon proved to be a naïve mistake. Once crowned King, Zog took his role seriously, adopting independent, often arrogant stances that even risked causing a crisis in relations between the two countries. Specifically, in 1934, Zog refused to renew the trade treaty with Italy and signed one with Yugoslavia instead.
King Zog was a very suspicious man who viewed politics as a palace intrigue in which he was a "master." He rarely appeared in public, spoke little, and confided in no one. The only influence he yielded to was that of his family, particularly his sisters, whom he had made generals, granting them military ranks. Dressed in uniforms, they commanded the royal palace and displayed an anti-Italian attitude, partly because they feared that Rome might give the King an Italian wife who would displace them.
This was indeed the project that Rome was cultivating, and to realize it, someone even suggested “sacrificing” a Savoy blood princess to Zog. However, none were willing to do so, and instead, they settled on a Neapolitan baroness. In Naples was the Marquis of Auletta, a descendant of Giorgio Kastrioti Skanderbeg, the great Albanian national hero. The Marquis had two daughters, so it was considered why not marry one to Zog, reuniting the new dynasty with the old one?
This hypothesis was discarded by fascist leaders. The reasoning in Rome was complex: the young Auletta, once queen of Albania, risked becoming more Albanian than the Albanians themselves, while a princess would have been quite different. Then, given her royal blood, in the event of Zog’s death, it would be easier to organize an Italian regency. In any case, to reaffirm his independence, Zog wanted to make his own choice. He did so based on a photograph shown to him by a Hungarian girl, suggested by his secretary. Zog rejected the girl but kept the photograph and invited the original to Tirana. She was Geraldine Apponyi, heir to a fallen great Hungarian family, who had no dowry other than her name and a sweet face that matched her gentle character.
The wedding was celebrated on November 28, 1937, the 25th anniversary of Albanian independence, and it became yet another source of conflict, this time a deeper one, with Italy. Not only because Zog had refused an Italian bride, but also due to the insults directed mainly by his sisters at the two Italian representatives, Ciano for the government and the Duke of Bergamo for the House of Savoy. The crisis was already in the air for less trivial reasons, but Ciano’s irritation perhaps aggravated it, and Zog, either unaware of it or out of pride, did nothing to prevent it.
As Italy’s Foreign Minister, Ciano had obtained that the Yugoslavs leave him free rein in Albania through the secret clauses of a 1937 treaty. He then bombarded Mussolini with reports that depicted Albania as a rich country, indeed a wealthy one, suggesting a potential German interference in this territory, long under Italian control. Ciano’s descriptions often included social notes in an anti-Zog key.
In May 1938, thanks to his persuasive efforts, Ciano obtained from the Duce preliminary approval to prepare action for the following May. Meanwhile, the Duce’s protégé, who was extremely unscrupulous in choosing the means of his politics, even contemplated the assassination of Zog. On October 27, 1938, he wrote in his diary:
“The action is becoming clear: the assassination of the King (it seems that Koçi will handle it for a reward of ten million), street movements, the descent of bands loyal to us (practically all the chiefs except those of Kmia), appeal to Italy for political and, if necessary, military intervention, offer of the crown to the King Emperor, and, at a later stage, annexation. Jacomoni guarantees that everything can happen regularly with a month’s notice.”
Until that moment, Ciano had acted on his own initiative. There was an ongoing duel between Ciano and Zog. Mussolini wavered, swayed between annexation and distancing, depending on the evolution of international events.
Hitler, with his conquests, helped Ciano. But once again, the Duce preferred to delay, perhaps not entirely convinced by his son-in-law's fanciful descriptions of Albanian riches. Mussolini explained to Ciano that landing in Albania would shake up the Yugoslav state and favor “a Croatian independence under the German aegis, which would mean the Prussians in Sussak[2].”
“It’s not worth the risk,” added the Duce, “to take such a chance just to have Albania, which we could get at any other time.”
Instead of military occupation, Mussolini thought of a pact that would subject Albania entirely to Italy while maintaining international appearances, but leaving no doubt about the event's essence. He proposed it to Zog. The treaty would authorize the landing of Italian troops in the country, but as allies, not as invaders. A personal note from the Duce to Zog communicated the intention to “strengthen the alliance to the point of sharing the same fate for the two states and peoples.” Zog would keep his throne by agreeing. Otherwise, “the consequences would fall on him and the Albanian people.”
This was not what Ciano wanted. The protectorate wasn’t enough for him; he had plotted for conquest. It was, however, what Vittorio Emanuele III wanted, convinced that it wasn’t worth embarking on a major adventure for “four stones.”
At this point, Zog made a fatal error in judgment. Having been accustomed for years to maneuver through difficult situations and emerge unscathed through deceitful tactics, he deluded himself into thinking he could stall after the treaty proposal, which was an Italian-style diktat—softer than the German ones, but non-negotiable.
On March 31, 1939, the invasion plan was finalized at Palazzo Chigi, prepared too late and with means that would have been inadequate if only the Albanians had offered resistance. Present at the meeting were Ciano, General Guzzoni, who had been appointed that day to command the Italian troops, and Jacomoni. The lack of Italian preparation was glaringly obvious: “it seems that the entire army can’t muster a single trained motorcyclist battalion that should reach Tirana by surprise,” Ciano noted. Fired up by an enterprise over which he claimed sponsorship, Ciano studied every detail in his amateurish and boisterous manner.
On April 4, 1939, Italian pressure on Zog became definitive. He had to respond within 24 hours. Then, he was granted an extension, but for only one day. A telegram signed by Mussolini on the evening of April 5 demanded a “positive or negative” answer from Zog by the next day, no later than noon. Cornered, Zog made counterproposals, at least to soften certain clauses that cemented his role as a vassal. At dawn on April 5, a male heir was born to him. On April 6, at four in the afternoon, Italian ships sailed for Durres, where troops landed on the mainland before daylight. However, the previous midnight, Albanian Foreign Minister Libohova had gone to the Italian legation and informed Jacomoni that Zog was ready to negotiate. Jacomoni informed the Foreign Minister and learned from the response telegram that he had been excluded from any further discussions. If the Albanian King wanted to negotiate, he could do so with Guzzoni. King Zog expressed his willingness to accept the presence of a division in the country but insisted on some treaty amendments.
He was merely buying time; in reality, he was preparing to flee to Greece with his large family.
Finally, on the morning of April 8, Galeazzo Ciano was able to land in occupied Tirana. This was followed by speeches, toasts, and demonstrations of crowds cheering for Ciano, who appeared on the balcony of Skanderbeg Palace. The military operation was a parade of motorcyclists, cyclists, and small tanks of the Centauro Division under the command of General Messe. The 45,000 armed men who were rumored to be ready to fight never appeared. Only in Durres were some deaths counted among the Italian troops—eight sailors and three Bersaglieri.
The landing of Italian troops in Durres and the parade of Bersaglieri in Tirana.
King Zog did not leave behind much regret, although the presence of the queen and the newborn prince among the fleeing caravan gave the affair a romantic yet dramatic touch. The choice of Easter for the assault seemed particularly odious.
The task of forming the new “protected” government was entrusted to Shefqet Verlaci, one of many notables who hastened to collaborate with Jacomoni and Guzzoni.
A tailor-made Constituent Assembly unanimously approved the personal union between the two countries. The Albanians would have preferred the Albanian Crown to be offered to a Prince of the House of Savoy. Instead, it was decided to add the new crown to the others worn by King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia Vittorio Emanuele III. Afterward, Albanian life was shaped according to the Italian style, with a fascist party and an administration that took orders from Rome. On April 16, an Albanian delegation solemnly offered the crown to Vittorio Emanuele III. Verlaci, wrote Ciano, delivered the customary speech at the Quirinale “with fatigue and without conviction,” while the King and Emperor responded “with an uncertain and trembling voice” under the gaze of a “bronze giant, Mussolini.”
The Italian show of force provoked some international repercussions, but they were very modest, incomparable to the alarm caused by the German annexations. After all, by seizing Albania, Italy had, as someone observed, performed an act comparable to kidnapping one’s own wife. Particular nervousness was felt in the Balkan states. It was precisely the establishment in Albania that allowed Mussolini, a year and a half later, to embark on the disastrous and inglorious campaign of Greece.
Bibliography:
Amadeo Giannini, L’Albania dall’indipendenza all’unione con l’Italia, 1913-1939. Varese 1940.
Indro Montanelli, Mario Cervi, Storia d’Italia, 1936-1943. Rizzoli 1980.
Pietro Quaroni, Valigia diplomatica. Garzanti, 1956.
[1] The observation is Ciano's
[2] Sussak (in Croatian Sušak) is a populous suburb of the city of Rijeka, in Croatia
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