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Edi Rama: Twenty-Eight Years at the Centre of Power
Tirana, October 2026. Outside the buildings of the state, two incompatible images of the same Albania meet. On one side stands a prime minister speaking of public order, investment, European negotiations and threats of destabilisation. On the other are students, young workers and citizens asking for better education, political accountability and a future that does not force them to leave. Between them are stones and tear gas, but also a question that predates the clashes: why has part of the country stopped believing its institutions are listening?
The name addressed by the protests is Edi Rama. In 1998 he joined the cabinet as culture minister. In 2000 he became mayor of Tirana; in 2005 he took over the Socialist Party; in 2013 he became prime minister. Twenty-eight years after entering government, he remains at the centre of the national debate. That is the historical point of departure: his longevity does not mean uninterrupted public office — between 2011 and 2013 he was neither mayor nor minister — but an almost continuous position of political prominence.
Rama’s long-standing political prominence reflects a combination of administrative achievements, election victories, the strength of the Socialist Party and the weakness of alternatives. These are different factors, which must be examined without confusing electoral support with a definitive answer to criticisms that may arise in subsequent years.
On 13 October 2026, as the protests spread, the European Union took another step in accession negotiations with Albania: four chapters had by then been provisionally closed. During the same week, the government faced fierce criticism in Tirana’s streets. Both facts are true. The apparent paradox — progress abroad and distrust at home — is the starting point for understanding this story, not a detail to conceal.
To understand Rama’s political biography, we must return to a country scarred by the collapse of pyramid investment schemes in 1997, a public-order crisis and the difficult search for new institutions. Albania had emerged from dictatorship without fully stabilising the rules of democracy. Power had familiar faces, but institutions were fragile and public confidence was weaker than the rhetoric of transition.
Rama came from the arts. A painter, teacher and public figure who inspired both enthusiasm and irritation, he was appointed Minister of Culture, Youth and Sport in 1998. He did not suddenly become a technocrat: he brought to public office an ability to communicate through images, gestures and provocations. His innovation was stylistic too. The risk, noted by some observers from the outset, was that the portrayal of change might precede demonstrable change itself.
His entry into government introduced a recognisable political language centred on personality and public gestures. Alongside cultural achievements, an institutional challenge remained: turning a minister’s initiatives into procedures, expertise and oversight capable of lasting beyond their initiator.
In 2000 he chose Tirana. This was no retreat: governing the capital meant reshaping the country’s most prominent showcase and building daily relationships with the administration, economic interests and residents. Here his political laboratory became visible.
The painted façades of buildings from the socialist era became part of the capital’s international image. Alongside the colour schemes came works on the Lana River, the recovery of public spaces, demolition of unauthorised buildings and infrastructure improvements. In 2004 Rama received the World Mayor award: it was not just personal recognition but a boost to the city’s international profile.
That transformation also raised administrative and social concerns. Demolitions and redevelopment disrupted established arrangements; the benefits did not reach every neighbourhood equally. Assessing his time as mayor therefore requires looking beyond photographs of the new Tirana to residents’ living conditions, resource distribution and transparency in decision-making.
In Tirana, a method emerged that would accompany Rama into national politics: a project-led vision, highly personal communication and the ability to turn public works into symbolic narratives. Yet support is not created by imagery alone. He was re-elected mayor in 2003 and 2007. Those results indicate a real political base that should not be dismissed as mere marketing.
By 2005 he had already become leader of the Socialist Party, then in national opposition. For several years, the mayor of the capital was also the government’s main political challenger. Here the rivalry with Sali Berisha ceased to be a simple clash of personalities and became a confrontation between two ways of portraying Albania’s future, backed by entrenched political blocs.
Sali Berisha belongs to the first generation of the transition: president of the republic in the 1990s, then head of government from 2005 to 2013. Rama represents a later era, yet his rise took shape in opposition to a political landscape partly created by Berisha. The contest has been electoral, institutional and narrative: each has often portrayed the other as the country’s central problem.
Their rivalry has made competing political choices recognisable, but frequently focused debate on personalities more than programmes. It has extended to electoral rules, independent bodies and the memory of past crises — areas in which a democracy’s strength is also measured by its ability to operate beyond individual leaders.
On 21 January 2011, four demonstrators were killed during a protest outside the prime minister’s office. Berisha headed the government; Rama led the opposition that had organised the demonstration. The clashes did not justify an unjustified use of lethal force. In Nika v. Albania, decided on 14 November 2023, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 2 of the Convention relating to the death of one protester and deficiencies in the investigation.
The Court examined serious shortcomings in reconstructing events and in the effectiveness of the investigations. Human Rights Watch had already called in January 2011 for prosecutors to investigate free from interference. The judgment concerns the state’s obligations and does not automatically establish Berisha’s personal criminal liability. That legal distinction does not diminish the institutions’ duty to account for the use of force.
After the January protest, the contest moved to the ballot box. In the municipal elections of 8 May 2011, the initial count put Rama ten votes ahead. A subsequent decision to count valid ballots placed in the wrong ballot boxes changed the result and sparked appeals and disputes. On 23 June the election commission declared Lulzim Basha, the Democratic Party candidate, the winner by 93 votes over Rama. The 81-vote margin reported at one stage of the dispute was not the final one. The OSCE/ODIHR documented procedural shortcomings; it was not Berisha personally who won but the candidate of his party.
Rama left city hall but remained head of the Socialist Party. Two years later, in the 2013 election, his coalition secured a majority and ended Berisha’s government. Moving from opposition into office reversed the two leaders’ roles and again raised the issue of democratic rules that both had invoked from opposing positions.
In 2026 their roles are reversed: Rama governs, while Berisha supports opposition to the government. Today’s demonstrations cannot be equated with the four deaths in 2011. Historical comparison instead recalls a constant principle: the right to demonstrate peacefully does not depend on which party holds power.
The government must protect people and property against assaults and arson; the opposition may challenge its choices. In both cases police action must be proportionate and subject to scrutiny. It is against this continuity of principles, rather than the polemic between Rama and Berisha, that the memory of 21 January should be assessed.
Rama has governed Albania since 2013 and, following the 2025 election, is serving his fourth term. The longevity of his administration is also an electoral fact: voters have repeatedly given the Socialists a majority. Ignoring that would distort history. But a competitive election does not by itself settle the quality of institutions between elections.
The OSCE/ODIHR final report on the May 2025 election contains two findings that must be considered together: voting was competitive and professionally administered, but contestants did not enjoy a level playing field. Observers noted misuse of public resources, pressure on employees and other problems affecting equality of competition. They did not invalidate the result politically; they identified flaws that a democratic system must address.
Meanwhile, Albania has made measurable progress towards EU accession. On 13 October 2026, as the current student protests began, negotiations reached the provisional closure of a fourth chapter. All 33 negotiating chapters had been opened. This is an institutional achievement, not an automatic guarantee of the final outcome or proof that every part of the country functions well.
Here lies a tension within Rama’s long period in office. Progress in EU negotiations is measured through opened chapters, reforms and formal commitments; public trust also depends on services, economic opportunity, the ability to challenge decisions and administrative impartiality. International achievements and domestic dissent can therefore coexist without cancelling each other out.
Allegations of corruption have long featured in Albanian politics and did not begin in October 2026. During the latest protest wave, particular attention has focused on proceedings involving Belinda Balluku, a former deputy prime minister and infrastructure minister. On 20 October, the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecution Office formally presented allegations relating, among other things, to public contracts, corruption and money laundering. Balluku denied wrongdoing. There has been no conviction, and it would be wrong to suggest otherwise.
The political issue is not identical to the criminal outcome. Courts assess evidence, individual responsibility and standards of proof; citizens also care about trust in those handling major public resources. The government must uphold suspects’ presumption of innocence while explaining the disputed administrative decisions. Neither a political scandal can replace a judgment nor the lack of a final conviction remove the need for public accountability.
Berisha invokes corruption in his criticism of the government, but calls for transparency apply across party lines. Criminal proceedings are not a verdict and do not automatically establish responsibility on the part of a party or prime minister. Equally, the absence of a final conviction does not erase a political duty to explain contested administrative choices.
The October demonstrations have origins extending beyond party politics. In spring 2026 an environmental movement emerged against a controversial tourism development in the Vjosa–Narta coastal area, recognisable through its pink flamingo symbol. On 13 October, student protests about education costs and economic prospects gave new momentum to dissent. Criticism of corruption and calls for resignation followed.
Berisha publicly supported the young protesters and urged Democratic Party members to join them. On 17 October his party circulated remarks promising protection and support for the student revolt. This is an explicit political choice, legitimate as such. It does not, however, prove that the Democratic Party created, organised or controlled the entire movement.
Independent accounts describe a mobilisation unwilling to be absorbed into the traditional Rama–Berisha duel. Some opposition representatives met with distrust when attempting to address crowds. This is crucial: if the protest also challenges the political class as a whole, treating it as merely an extension of Berisha would obscure part of its meaning.
Alongside peaceful marches, assaults, property damage and fires have occurred. Police have used tear gas and water cannon; numerous arrests and injuries have been reported. On 21 October health authorities reported 320 people injured since 13 October: 192 police officers, 92 demonstrators and 36 bystanders, including six media workers. These are health figures for a specific period and scope, not a judgment about responsibility.
The Ombudsman has raised preliminary concerns about detention conditions and the treatment of those held. Those findings require further examination and are not court judgments. At the same time, it is necessary to establish who attacked officers, who damaged public and private property and whether each police intervention was proportionate. Otherwise political confrontation turns security and rights into opposing banners, although both are obligations of the state.
On 18 October Rama said that an explosive drone allegedly heading towards government headquarters had been neutralised two days earlier, raising possible foreign interference. On 20 October he referred to “hybrid warfare” and digital operations which, in his account, could be linked to Russian or Iranian actors. These are the prime minister’s claims: the sources reviewed do not in themselves amount to independent technical proof.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova rejected the allegations. Her denial, too, is a political statement. Albania previously reported cyberattacks attributed to Iran in 2022, but that precedent does not demonstrate Iranian involvement in the 2026 protests. Establishing foreign direction would require evidence of coordination and attribution of operations, distinct from the demonstrators’ own demands.
On 16 September 2026 the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague delivered a first-instance judgment against Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi. The verdict concerns war crimes; all four were acquitted of the counts relating to crimes against humanity. The decision is not final and addresses individual responsibility, not the legitimacy of Kosovo’s struggle for independence.
Rama reacted sharply to the ruling, recalling the Kosovo war’s place in Albanian national memory. Yet the Hague proceedings remain separate from Tirana’s political crisis: the proximity of dates does not establish a causal link with the protests or the accusations of foreign interference. Any such connection would require specific evidence.
Edi Rama’s career spans almost thirty years of Albanian history: a ministerial post in the late 1990s, Tirana’s transformation, leadership of the Socialist Party and four terms as prime minister. Electoral support, party organisation and recognisable achievements in relations with Europe have all contributed to his continuity. It is a concrete political history that cannot be reduced either to an image of modernisation or to the latest criticism.
Rama’s continuing prominence has unfolded alongside an equally enduring rivalry with Sali Berisha. Their confrontation has shaped democratic transition, providing voters with recognisable alternatives while often pushing the strengthening of independent institutions into the background. The 2025 election and 2026 demonstrations reveal two realities that must be considered together: legitimacy gained at the ballot box and the demands of citizens who do not feel heard.
The significance of twenty-eight years therefore lies not simply in the succession of offices. It lies in how a figure initially presented as a break with the past came to personify a prolonged period of power. Longevity may show political skill and rooted support, but also makes it harder to separate achievements from unresolved problems.
Albania’s future will depend not only on how long Rama remains in office or on who might replace him. It will depend on whether rules, oversight and opportunities function for those who govern, those who oppose them and those who take to the streets without identifying with either side. That is the question his long political journey leaves the country.
Part five will return to the origins of the environmental mobilisation. The series finale will distinguish established facts from hypotheses about possible connections between protests, foreign interference and the debate over KLA historical memory, without inferring a common operation solely from coinciding dates.
Sources are provided with active links. Statements by the government and opposition are identified as partisan sources.
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